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Abstract 
This paper reports three experiments that investigate the 
influence of pragmatic, communicative factors on 
categorization.  Little attention has been given to the role 
played by pragmatic factors such as the intended audience and 
purpose of communication.  Experiment 1 establishes baseline 
measures of categorization and similarity for a range of 
exemplars of biological categories.  Experiment 2 reveals that 
the judged categorization and similarity of these exemplars is 
affected by the audience to whom such judgments would be 
communicated.  Experiment 3 reveals that these judgments 
are also affected by the communicative purpose of the 
categorization.  In combination, these data suggest that 
pragmatic factors have systematic effects on similarity and 
categorization, and suggestions are made as to how these 
might be explained. 
Keywords: Categorization; pragmatics; communication; 
concepts. 
Introduction 
Murphy & Medin (1985) and others have argued that 
concepts are embedded in commonsense or naïve domain-
specific theories, and that categorization is explanation- as 
opposed to similarity-based.  According to this view the 
content a concept has depends upon the links between that 
concept and all others which figure in a theory of the 
domain.  For example, whether a person categorizes a tree 
as an oak may depend upon whether they consider it to fall 
under some concepts of the theory (e.g., deciduous or 
pinnate).  Thus the theory, or network of concepts, supports 
an explanation of the object’s properties.  This account, 
however, leaves open what exactly should count as an 
explanation. 
van Fraassen (1980) argued that explanation is pragmatic, 
or relevance-based.  On this view, explanations are answers 
to ‘why’ questions, and what counts as a good answer will 
depend upon the circumstances (see also Ruben, 1990).  For 
example, an explanation of the fact that a particular tree has 
leaves might, in summer, include reference to its 
membership of the category ‘tree’.  In winter, however, this 
would be a poor explanation; a good explanation would 
need to refer to the tree’s membership of the category 
‘evergreen tree’.  For van Fraassen (see also Putnam, 1978) 
good explanations depend on relevant contrast categories 
that do not have the properties which need explaining (e.g., 
non-tree would be the relevant leaf-less contrast category in 
summer; deciduous tree in winter). 
It is possible to extrapolate from van Fraasen’s account to 
develop predictions concerning the influences of 
communicative factors on categorization.  Applying van 
Fraasen’s view of explanation to the theory-based account 
of concepts, a categorization of an object as a member of a 
category depends on what contrast categories are relevant in 
the circumstances, which itself depends upon for what 
purpose and to whom the explanation is to be given.  It 
would therefore be expected that categorization would be 
influenced by such pragmatic, communicative factors as 
audience and purpose. 
While no studies have provided direct evidence of the role 
of pragmatic factors, many are consonant with their 
influence.  Barsalou (1983) showed that a categorizer’s goal 
united members of ad hoc categories such as ‘things to take 
with you in case of fire.’  Medin, Lynch, Coley & Atran 
(1997) found that tree experts could use their conceptual 
knowledge differently in different kinds of task.  For 
example, landscapers tended to use biological, taxonomic 
information in reasoning about trees, but sorted them into 
categories on the basis of attributes relevant to landscaping 
(e.g., height, weediness).  Ross & Murphy (1999) showed 
that participants could cross-classify the domain of food 
stuffs according to ‘script’-based notions or taxonomic ones.  
That is, their categories reflected the extent to which foods 
fitted particular routines or action sequences governing food 
(e.g., foods eaten in a restaurant, foods eaten between 
meals) as well as particular ‘taxonomic’ categories (e.g., 
dairy products).  And other authors have argued that 
categorization must be understood as a means to an end (see 
Ross, 1997; Solomon, Medin & Lynch, 1999). 
Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi & Wang (1999) showed that 
categorization of artifacts, as determined by naming, varied 
across different linguistic groups, while similarity remained 
relatively stable.  Malt, Sloman & Gennari (2003), also 
considering artifacts, argued that categorization is 
determined by a combination of stimulus properties and the 
linguistic and cultural properties of the categorizer’s 
language.  Similar factors might explain Barsalou & 
Sewell’s (1984) finding that adopting a different perspective 
alters typicality judgments.  Their (United States) 
participants, adopting a US perspective, considered ‘eagle’ 
to be more typical than ‘peacock’; this was reversed when 
they adopted a Chinese perspective.  While suggestive, none 
of these studies provides direct evidence of the role of 
audience and purpose in categorization. 
Perhaps the most direct evidence for the potential 
influence of pragmatic factors on categorization comes from 
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Markman & Makin (1998).  They used a referential 
communication task (cf. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) in 
which dyads of participants collaborated in building models 
from toy bricks.  One participant, the director, was shown 
pictorial instructions for building a model, and was then 
required to communicate these in order that another 
participant, the model builder, could build the model 
successfully.  In two experiments, they found that the 
referential communication task led to greater between-
participant consistency in subsequently sorting the toy 
bricks. These results suggest an important interplay between 
referential communication and categorization, and it is 
possible to extrapolate from these data also to predict effects 
of pragmatic factors on categorization. 
Clark (1996) emphasizes the importance to successful 
referential communication of what he calls common ground, 
an indication of the extent of shared information that 
speakers and hearers can mutually assume.  One source of 
common ground is community membership – biologists can 
assume more shared information in communication with 
other members of the biologist community than with 
lawyers, for example.  Consideration of common ground 
therefore suggests an influence of intended audience.  
However, this may also depend on communicative purpose.  
What matters is that speakers and hearers establish common 
ground “well enough for current purposes” (Clark, 1996; p. 
221). A biologist and lawyer may have insufficient common 
ground to communicate about the taxonomic definition of 
whales, but may communicate successfully enough to 
identify one swimming alongside a ship.  Effects of 
audience and purpose can also be explicated by pragmatic 
accounts of communication such as Grice’s (1975) ‘co-
operativeness principle’ which suggests people design 
communications to be relevant (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995) 
to the nature or purpose of the exchange in which the 
communicators are engaged. 
Despite the potential connections between referential 
communication and categorization, no studies have directly 
addressed the potential influences of intended audience or 
communicative purpose on categorization.  The following 
experiments were designed to address this gap.  Experiment 
2 investigated the influence of different kinds of intended 
audience to whom categorization judgments are to be 
conveyed.  Experiment 3 investigated the role of the 
purpose of communication.  Experiment 1 establishes 
‘baseline’ measures of categorization and similarity. 
The experiments use the same exemplars of the same 
biological categories, so that stimulus properties are held 
constant across all three.  The experiments elicit both 
categorization and similarity judgments since the possibility 
that these can dissociate raises the question as to whether 
pragmatic factors will impact them in the same way.  
Previous work (e.g., Thibaut, Dupont & Anselme, 2002) has 
shown that stimuli defined by the presence of both 
necessary and characteristic features may be categorized 
according to the necessary feature, and rated for similarity 
according to the characteristic feature.  Accordingly, 
exemplars were defined in terms of the presence or absence 
of genetic- and appearance-based properties, and are drawn 
from previous work (Braisby, 2004).  The use of these 
stimuli also allows for an indirect evaluation of 
essentialism, since it contends that categorization is 
determined by people’s beliefs concerning deep, underlying 
causes (such as genetics). 
Experiment 1 
Design 
Task (Categorization, Similarity), Appearance (A+,A−) and 
Genetics (G+,G−) were within-participants factors. 
 
Participants 30 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school volunteered 
to participate. 
 
Materials Materials were text descriptions of exemplars of 
four biological food categories, chosen from previous work 
(Braisby, 2004): salmon, apple, potato and chicken.  For 
each category, four exemplars were defined by the presence 
or absence of appearance and genetic properties: A+G+; 
A+G−; A−G+; and A−G−.  Sixteen scenarios were 
constructed, one for each combination of exemplar and 
category.  An example scenario for ‘apple’ follows; the first 
set of brackets indicates wordings for G+ and G− 
conditions, and the second set indicates the A+ and A− 
wordings. “You have just bought an apple from a reputable 
retailer.  On examining its packaging closely, you find that 
it has been genetically modified [but it retains ALL/so that it 
has NONE] of the genetic properties specific to apples.  On 
closer examination, you find that it [looks, feels, smells and 
even tastes JUST/does NOT look, feel, smell or even taste] 
like an apple.” 
 
Procedure All scenarios were presented and responses 
recorded using E-prime (Schneider, Eschman & Zuccolotto, 
2002). Participants were given a practice example, and then 
presented with the 16 scenarios.  After each, participants 
judged the category membership of the exemplar given the 
category label (e.g., apple), choosing either a Yes or No 
judgment.  They then rated the exemplar for similarity 
relative to the category label on a 7-point scale.  Scenarios 
were presented in random order. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization question were summed over 
the four categories, yielding a scale of 0 to 4; the similarity 
question was transformed to the same scale using the 
formula Similarity = (Original Rating -1)*4/6 (i.e., rating of 
1 maps to zero; rating of 7 maps to 4; note, high scores 
imply high rated similarity). Both similarity and 
categorization scores were analysed using ANOVA with 
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Task (Similarity, Categorization), Appearance (A+,A−) and 
Genetics (G+,G−) all factors. 
 
Table 1: Categorization and similarity in experiment 1. 
Exemplar Categorization Similarity 
A+G+ 3.2 3.4 
A+G- 1.4 2.5 
A-G+ 1.5 1.0 
A-G- 0.3 0.3 
 
Categorization and similarity for the four types of 
exemplar are shown in Table 1.  There was no main effect 
of Task.  There were main effects of Appearance [F(1,29) = 
102.25, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.78] and Genetics [F(1,29) = 49.56, 
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.63], and interactions between Task and 
Appearance [F(1,29) = 8.81, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.23], Task and 
Genetics [F(1,29) = 11.70, p < 0.005; η2 = 0.29], and 
Appearance and Genetics [F(1,29) = 5.64, p < 0.05; η2 = 
0.16], as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Appearance and genetics in experiment 1. 
 Categorization Similarity Overall 
Appearance + 2.3 2.9 2.6 
Appearance - 0.9 0.6 0.8 
Difference 1.4 2.3 1.9 
Genetics + 2.4 2.2 2.3 
Genetics - 0.9 1.4 1.1 
Difference 1.5 0.8 1.1 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 demonstrates that appearance and genetic 
properties, as defined for this stimulus set, have unequal 
influences on categorization and similarity judgments.  
Overall, the presence of appearance properties increases 
similarity and categorization scores more than does the 
presence of genetic properties (1.9 vs. 1.1 – see overall 
difference scores in Table 2). However, these effects 
interact with task. For categorization judgments, genetic and 
appearance properties have a roughly equal influence, 
whereas appearance properties have a much greater 
influence on similarity judgments (2.3 v. 0.8).  These 
findings provide the baseline pattern relative to which the 
influences of audience and purpose can be assessed. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 examined the effects on categorization of 
communicating with different kinds of intended audience: 
an adult native English speaker, a 4 year old child native 
speaker, and an adult non-native speaker of English. 
Design 
Appearance (A+,A−), Genetics (G+,G−), and Audience (4 
yr old, Native, Non-Native) were within-participants factors. 
Task (Categorization, Similarity) was a between-subject 
factor. 
Method 
Participants 60 undergraduate psychology students, all 
native English speakers, attending an Open University 
residential school volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials The same materials in experiment 1 were used. 
 
Procedure The procedure for Experiment 1 was used with 
the following modifications. For each scenario, participants 
were instructed to imagine having an ordinary conversation 
about the category exemplar with one of the following 
different kinds of audience: an adult, native speaker of 
English (Native); a child aged approximately 4 years, who 
has a limited understanding of what words really mean (4 yr 
old); an adult non-native speaker of English, who can 
communicate if they use an English phrase book, and the 
conversation is very limited (Non-Native).  For each 
exemplar, participants were asked to imagine that one of 
these audiences had asked them whether the exemplar was a 
member of the category (categorization), or how similar the 
exemplar was to their idea or image of a category 
(similarity).  Order of presentation of scenarios and 
audiences was random. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization and similarity questions 
(transformed as before) were analysed using ANOVA with 
Task (Categorization, Similarity) a between-subjects factor, 
and Appearance (A+,A−), Genetics (G+,G−) and Audience 
(4 yr old, Native, Non-Native) all within-subject factors. 
There was no effect of Task.  There were main effects of 
Appearance [F(1,58) = 246.24, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.81], 
Genetics [F(1,58) = 89.05, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.61], and 
Audience [F(2,116) = 8.06, p < 0.005; η2 = 0.12] 
interactions between Task and Genetics [F(1,58) = 4.70, p < 
0.05; η2 = 0.08], Appearance and Genetics [F(1,58) = 5.34, 
p < 0.05; η2 = 0.08] (see Table 3), Appearance and 
Audience [F(2,116) = 11.72, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.17], and 
Genetics and Audience [F(2,116) = 9.36, p < 0.005; η2 = 
0.14] these being subsumed by a three-way interaction 
between Appearance, Genetics and Audience [F(2,116) = 
7.05, p < 0.005; η2 = 0.11] (see Table 4). (Note, in these and 
subsequent tables, categorization and similarity ratings are 
combined.) 
 
Table 3. Categorization and similarity in experiment 2. 
Exemplar 4 yr old Native Non-native 
A+G+ 3.4 3.1 3.5 
A+G- 2.8 1.7 2.7 
A-G+ 1.1 1.1 1.1 
A-G- 0.5 0.5 0.6 
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Table 4.  Appearance and genetics in experiment 2. 
 4 yr 
old 
Native Non-native 
Appearance + 3.1 2.4 3.1 
Appearance - 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Difference 2.3 1.6 2.2 
Genetics + 2.2 2.1 2.3 
Genetics - 1.7 1.1 1.6 
Difference 0.6 1.0 0.7 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
Overall, appearance properties make a stronger contribution 
to categorization and similarity judgments than do genetic 
properties.  However, these contributions are influenced by 
audience.  Whereas the influence of appearance properties is 
weakest when communicating with adult native speakers, 
this is when genetic properties exert their strongest 
influence.  The pattern of influence of both properties is 
similar for adult non-native speakers as it is for child native 
speakers.  In addition to these findings, the influence of 
genetic properties overall is greater in categorization 
judgments (G+ = 2.5, G- =  1.6, Difference = 0.9) than 
similarity (G+ = 2.0, G- = 1.4, Difference = 0.6), reflecting 
a similar finding in Experiment 1.  Interestingly, judgments 
to the ‘4yr old’ and ‘non-native’ audiences parallel the 
similarity judgments in Experiment 1, suggesting 
participants are shifting their categorization judgments in 
these conditions to more closely reflect ‘baseline’ similarity. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 examined the effect on categorization of 
communicating with different kinds of purpose: defining the 
meaning of a word; everyday conversation; using the word 
to pick out an object from a set of pictures. 
Design 
Task (Categorization, Similarity) was  a between-subjects 
factor, Appearance (A+,A−), Genetics (G+,G−), and 
Purpose (Defining, Conversing, Picking Out) were within-
participants factors. 
 
Participants 60 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school volunteered 
to participate. 
 
Materials The same materials in Experiment 1 were used. 
 
Procedure The procedure for experiment 2 was modified as 
follows.  For each scenario, participants were asked to 
imagine conversing with an adult, native speaker with one 
of the following purposes in mind: a) to define the meaning 
of a word; b) to hold an everyday conversation; or c) to use 
the word to pick out an object in a picture book. For each 
exemplar, participants were asked to imagine that a member 
of these audiences had asked them whether the exemplar 
was a member of the given category (categorization) or how 
similar the exemplar was to their idea or image of a category 
(similarity). Order of presentation of scenarios and purposes 
was random. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization and typicality questions 
(transformed as before) were analysed using ANOVA with 
Task (Categorization, Similarity) a between-subjects factor, 
Appearance (A+,A−), Genetics (G+,G−), and Purpose 
(Defining, Conversing, Picking Out) all within-subject 
factors. 
There was no effect of Task, but main effects of 
Appearance [F(1,58) = 365.17, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.86], 
Genetics [F(1,58) = 37.75, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.39], and 
Purpose [F(2,116) = 5.41, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.09] interactions 
between Appearance and Purpose [F(2,116) = 12.87, p < 
0.001; η2 = 0.18], Genetics and Purpose [F(2,116) = 9.50, p 
< 0.001; η2 = 0.14] and Appearance and Genetics [F(1,58) = 
10.50, p < 0.005; η2 = 0.15] (see Table 5).  The three-way 
interaction between Appearance, Genetics and Purpose, 
however, was not significant.  The two-way interactions 
between Purpose and Appearance, and Purpose and 
Genetics are shown in Table 6. 
  
Table 5. Categorization and similarity in experiment 3. 
Exemplar Defining Conversing Picking out 
A+G+ 3.3 3.5 3.8 
A+G- 2.4 2.8 3.4 
A-G+ 0.8 0.9 0.6 
A-G- 0.4 0.6 0.5 
 
Table 6. The influence of purpose in Experiment 3. 
 Defining Conversing Picking out 
Appearance + 2.8 3.2 3.6 
Appearance - 0.6 0.8 0.5 
Difference 2.2 2.4 3.1 
Genetics + 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Genetics - 1.4 1.7 1.9 
Difference 0.6 0.5 0.2 
Discussion of Experiment 3 
Overall, appearance properties make a much stronger 
contribution to categorization and similarity judgments than 
do genetic properties.  However, these contributions are 
influenced by purpose.  The contribution of genetic 
properties increases from ‘Picking Out’ to ‘Conversing’ to 
‘Defining’, whereas the contribution of appearance 
properties decreases in this same order.  Indeed, the pattern 
for Defining and Conversing resembles that for similarity 
ratings in Experiment 1. 
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General Discussion 
Experiments 2 and 3 show that the contribution of 
appearance and genetic properties to categorisation and 
similarity, shifts according to intended audience and 
communicative purpose.  These shifts in categorisation (and 
similarity) judgments are dramatic – A+G- exemplars are 
either clearly in the category (picking out, experiment 3) or 
pretty much not in the category at all (native speaker, 
experiment 2).  In everyday conversation (experiment 3), 
categorisation appears much as it would when 
communicating with a 4 year old or a non-native speaker 
(experiment 2).  When categorising for a native speaker 
(experiment 2), the influence of appearance falls relatively 
speaking, while that of genetics increases.  Categorisation 
for a native speaker most closely resembles baseline 
categorisation – categorisation judgments when no audience 
or purpose is specified (experiment 1).  However, for all of 
the other purposes and audiences used in these experiments, 
judgments appear to most closely resemble baseline 
similarity. 
One explanation for these shifts derives from Clark’s 
(1996) notion of common ground.  For the purpose of 
picking out a picture in a book, genetic properties would 
generally be irrelevant. Moreover, because they are non-
visible, these properties cannot be assumed to be known to 
both speaker and hearer, unless they both belong to a certain 
community.  For example, two generally well-educated and 
fluent speakers of English could be considered to have some 
awareness of and language for genetic properties.  In 
communication with one another, they could assume some 
knowledge of these properties, and so make their judgments 
accordingly when they deem that genetic properties are 
relevant.  In communicating with different communities – 4 
year olds, non-native speakers – this assumption cannot be 
so readily made.  Therefore, assumptions about community 
membership and the hidden nature of genetic properties, can 
render explicable some of these shifts in the influence of 
genetic properties.  By contrast, appearance properties can 
be generally assumed to be apprehended by speakers and 
hearers of all but particular impaired communities. 
Although these experiments were not aimed at addressing 
essentialism in categorisation, because of the nature of the 
materials used they have relevance to this literature.  
Experiment 1 confirmed previous findings from Braisby 
(2001, 2004) that suggests categorisation in biological 
categories does not show a strong dependence on genetic 
factors.  Such a finding is at odds with the literature on 
essentialism which supposes factors such as genetics – deep 
underlying causes – are strongly determining of 
categorisation.  However, the findings of experiments 2 and 
3 suggest one possible explanation.  Participants appear 
most essentialist, and give greatest weight to genetic factors, 
when communicating with other adult native speakers, and 
also when communicating for the purpose of defining the 
category.  When the communicative context presents 
participants with different intended audiences or different 
purposes, they appear much less essentialist.  One 
interpretation for these findings is that essentialism, far from 
being a blueprint for categorisation, reflects a mode of 
categorisation, one that is appropriate for certain contexts 
and situations.  When communication of a certain kind is 
required, categorisation may appear to conform to 
essentialism; in other circumstances, it may appear to be 
non-essentialist.  This interpretation fits comfortably with 
the observation that categorisation can be given in a rule-
based or similarity-based mode (cf. Smith & Sloman, 1994). 
It may also be that the notion of community membership 
can be used to make sense of the general lack of 
essentialism displayed by the participants in these 
experiments.  In the case of communicating with native 
speakers, where participants appear least non-essentialist, 
participants are presumably influenced in their judgments 
by their membership of a shared linguistic community of 
native English speaking adults.  Perhaps it is reasonable to 
assume that other members of this community would also 
be aware of and concerned with genetic properties.  With 4 
year olds and non-native speakers this assumption may not 
hold.  Categorisation and similarity will then be conditioned 
by the assumed non-essentialist nature of these audiences.  
Thus, it may be that previous demonstrations of essentialism 
in part reflect assumptions on the part of participants 
concerning the communities to which they belong.  Perhaps 
participating in science experiments for University research 
would naturally lead participants to believe they are in a 
community where essentialism is assumed. 
In spite of the foregoing, there are aspects of these results 
that raise some methodological questions.  For example, all 
of the categories are food categories – curious hybrids 
between natural and artifact categories.  It is possible that 
because of their partly socially constructed nature, these 
categories are more susceptible than others to 
communicative influences.  It would be valuable to extend 
the research reported here with a range of different 
categories. 
Overall, these experiments suggest that categorisation and 
similarity judgements vary according to both the audience to 
whom one is communicating, and the purpose of that 
communication.  They suggest that future investigations of 
categorisation need to consider the potential impact of such 
pragmatic, communicative factors, and incorporate these 
into theoretical accounts. 
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